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6244

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HAR~IAN,

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and :MAY C.
YEAGER, his wife, FRIEDA
MURPHY, HILDA RICHES,
REKA CUMMINGS, OLIVE G.
FOX, E L S I E NORDBERG,
HORACE L. HARLINE and
LORINE HARLINE, his wife,
LERO... G. HARLINE (Also
sppll
"LEORY" G. HAR.~)
and ALBERT HARLINE, his wife, LEIGH A. HARLINE and KATHERINE HARLINE, his Wife, OSCAR J.
HARLINE and LORENA HARLINE, his Wife, OSROW L.
TILBY and SELMA TILBY, his
Wife,
Defendants.

MARY A.

No. 6244

Abstract and Brief of Appellants
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, Hon. Allen G. Thurman, Judge
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In the District Court of tbe Tbird Judicial District
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
MARY A.

HAR~IAN,

Plaintiff,

vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C.
YEAGE·R, his wife, FRIEDA
:MURPHY, HILDA RICHES,
REKA CUM~IINGS, OLIVE G.
FOX, E L S IE NORDBERG,
HORACE L. HARLINE and
LORINE HARLINE, his wife,
LEROY G. HARLINE (Also
spelled "LEORY" G. HARLINE) and ALBERT BARLINE, his wife, LEIGH A. BARLINE and KATHERINE HARLINE, his Wife, OSCAR J.
HARLINE and LORENA BARLINE, his Wife, OSROW L.
TILBY and SEL~IA TILBY, his
Defendants.
Wife,

COMPLAINT
62659

ABSTRACT AND BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Plaintiff complains of the defendants and for a
cause of action alleges :
1. The persons named in the caption as ''his
wife" are severally the wife of the defendant whose
name immediately precedes the name o~ such wife.
2. The name of the persons spelled '' Harline '' in
the caption is also spelled "Harlene" and the two
are pronounced alike.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

The name of defendant Leroy G. Harline

IS

also sometimes spelled '' Leory'' G. Harlin e.
4.

That plaintiff is the owner and lawfully pos-

sessed of the following described real property situated in S'alt Lake County, State of Utah, reference
being made to the recorded plate therein mentioned of
record in the Recorder's office of said county, viz:
Beginning at a point 148.55 feet south of the
Northwest corner of Lat 8, in Block 22, Plat
''A'', Big Field Survey, and running thence
North 76,775 feet; thence East 46 rods; thence
South 79.775 feet; thence westerly 46 rods, more
or less to the place of beginning.
5. That the said defendant and each of them claim
some right, title or interest in or to the said described
premises or some part thereof, adversely to this plaintiff and without right.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against
the said defendants and each of them, that they be
required to answer and plead what, if any, right, title
or interest they have, claim or assert in or to the said
described premises or any part thereof; that ·plaintiff's
title and right of possession of said premises may be
quieted and defendants and each of them be enjoined
from claiming the same or any part thereof; for general relief and for the costs of this action.
PAUL G. ELLIS, J. PATTON NEELEY,

Attorneys fot· Plaintiff.
(Duly Verified.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. HARMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and others,
Defendants.

~

Demurrer

To the plaintiff and her attorneys, Ellis and Neeley :
Comes now the defendants, Albert Yeager and May
C. Yeager, and demurers to the complaint of the plaintiff and for ground of demur alleges that the complaint does not state £acts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against these defendants.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 24th day of
April, 1939.
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants
Albert Yeager and M·ay C. Yeager.
I, L. E. Cluff, Attorney for defendants, Albert
Yeager and May C. Yeager, certifies that in my opinion the general demurrer above is well taken; filed in
good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
Salt Lake City, Utah. April 24th, 1939.
L. E. Cluff, Attorney.
Received a copy of this 24th day of April 1939.

J. P. Neeley. P. G. Ellis.
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. HARMAN,

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and others,
Defenda;nts.

Answer
62659

In answer to the complaint of the plaintiff, these
defendants, Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, admit,
deny and alleges:
1. Not having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief these defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs one, two and three, except as
to the allegations that these defendants herein are husband and wife which defendants admit.
2. In answer to paragraph four these defendants
alleg·e that on and immediately prior to the 18th day
of November, 19·32, these defendants were legal owners
and in possession of
The North 1f2 of the North :lj2 of Lot 8, Block 22,
Ten Acre Plat "A", Big F'ield Survey containing two and one-half acres of land;
that on or about said day these defendants executed
and delivered to rplaintiff a deed conveying part of
the property described above, said property being so
conveyed being described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point 8.7 rods (143.55 feet)
South of the Northwest corner of Lot 8, Block
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~2, Ten Acre Plat "A" Big Field Survc~' and
running thence North 4.32 (amended to 4.35 by
permission of Court) rods ; thence East 46 rods ;
thence South 4.35 rods; thence West 46 rods to
the place of beginning being the South 0 of the
North 14 of said Lot 8, containing 1;4 acres,
more or less together with 11;4 share of stock
in Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co .•

That dividing the property so conveyed from the property retained a fence had been constructed by the defendants and was standing at the time of the conveyance above mentioned and that said plaintiff has been
in possession of the property conveyed south of the
said fence and no part of the plaintiff (defendants 1)
land has been in the possession of said plaintiff.
3.

That so far as any conflict exists between prop-

erty described above and within the fence line as hereinabove described these defendants deny the allega·
tions of said plaintiff's complaint and the whole thereof
and alleges that plaintiff is not entitled to any part
or portion of the said North 1j2 of the North 11:::~ of the
North ¥2. of Lot 8, Block 22, Ten Acre Plat A, Big
Field Survey, Salt Lake City, Utah.
WHEREFORE these defendants pray that the
plaintiff take nothing by her action so far as the
property described of defendants and only that property conveyed to plaintiff and that these defendants
have their costs herein expended.
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants
Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager.
(Duly Verified.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD J"
DICIAL DirSTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY A. HARMAN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALBERT YEAGER,
Defendants.

Minute Entry.
Entered Order
Case Number
62659 Dated
September 6,
1939
ALLEN G.
THURMAN,
JUDGE

This case comes now on for trial, Paul G. Ell
and J. Patton Neeley, attorneys appearing in beha
of the plaintiff, L. E. Cluff, attorney appearing in b
half of the defendants Albert and May C. Yeager. T1
case is argued to the Court by respective counsE
Comes now counsel for plaintiff and moves the con
for a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plai
tiff and against the defendants Albert Yeager and M~
C. Yeager, and for judgment on the answer and stip·
lation of facts subscribed to by the plaintiff and r
maining defendants, except Albert and May C. Yeage
setting the boundary line between their properties ar
said motion is by the Court granted.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. HARMAN,
Plaint-iff,
YS.

ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C.
YEAGER, his Wife, and others,
Defendants.

Motion to Vacate Decree and
for Permission
to Amend
Answer

To the Plaintiff and her attorneys, P. G. Ellis and J.
Patton Neeley, Esqs:
Please take notice that the defendants, Albert
Yeager and

~fay

G. Yeager, intends to move the court

to vacate the decree entered in the above entitled action
and to permit the defendant to amend answer. Said
motion to be based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. No time was allowed defendants to file ob-

jections to Trial Minutes as prepared by attorneys for
Plaintiff in accordance with requirements of Rule XIII
of Rules of Practice in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District.
2. No time allowed Defendants to Amend Answer
after Motion for Judgment on the pleadings.
3. The decree is contrary to law.
4. That it was contrary to law to allow Plaintiff
to have Judgment on the Pleadings since denial in
Answer is sufficient to raise an issue.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5.

The Judgment is contrary to

l~aw

and the court

erred in entering Judgment on the Pleadings since in
making the motion by plaintiff, the court have treated
the denial as sufficient and the case should have gone
to trial and plaintiff required to offer evidence in support of complaint.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 22nd day of
September, 1939.
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants.
Received a copy of thB above this 25th day of September, 1939.
Ellis & Neeley, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF, UTAH
MARY A. HARMAN,

Plarintijf,
vs.
lLBERT YE~GER and MAY G.
YEAGER, his Wife, and others,
Defendants.

MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

To the Plaintiff and her Attorneys, P. G. Ellis and J.
Patton Neeley, Esqs:
Take notice, that defendants, Albert Yeager and
May G. Yeager, intend to move the court to vacate
and set aside the decision rendered in the above cause,
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and to grant a new trial of said cause, upon the following grounds, to wit:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court.
2. Irregularity in the Order of the Court.
3. Abuse of discretion by which defendants were
prevented from having a fair trial.
-i.

Accident and surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.

5. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision.
6. That the decision of the court is against law.
7. Error in law occurring at the trial.
Said motion will be made upon affidavits hereafter to
be filed and served upon you or a statement of the
cause to be hereafter prepared or upon the minutes
of the court in said cause.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 22nd Day of
September, 1939.
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants
Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager.
Received a copy of the above this 25th day of September, 1939.
Ellis & Neeley, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. HARMAN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C.
YEAGER, his Wife, et al.,

DECREE
62659

Defendwnts.

The Court having heretofore ordered the entry
of a decree in favor of the plaintiff above named
against the defendant Yeager in conformity to the
Court's order sustaining a motion of plaintiff for judgment in her favor against the defendants Albert Yeager (whose full name is Albert L. Yeager) and May C.
Yeager, his Wife; and also upon plaintiff's motion for
a judgment or decree in her favor .against the remaining defendants named in the caption hereto, which the
Court did likewise sustain, settling boundaries, and
quieting plaintiff's title, and enjoining claims or acts
of the defendants contrary thereto; NOW THEREFORE:
1. It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the

Court that the plaintiff has good title in fee simple
to the following described real property situate in Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, reference being
made to the recorded rna ps and plats therein mentioned

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
of record in the office of the County Recorder for Salt
Lake County, Utah, for further precision in detail, to
wit:
"Beginning at a point which is 148.55 feet south
of the northwest corner of lot 8, in block 22,
Ten-acre plat A, Big Field Survey, and running
thence north 76.775 feet to a point which is 4.35
rods or 71.775 feet south of said northwest corner of said Lot 8; thence east or easterly 46
rods; thence south 79.775 feet to a point which is
151.55 feet south of the northeast corner of said
lot 8, in block 22, 10-acre Plat A Big Field Survey, thence west or westerly 46 rods to the
place of beginning.''
Together with all improvements thereon,
and all hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, and also together with 11~ share
of stock in the Big Cottonwood Lower Canal
Company, and all water and water rights represented by said 11~ share of stock.
And that plaintiff is in possession and has full rights of
possession in and to all the above described premises.
2. That the defendants and each one of them, to
wit: Albert Yeager (whose full name is Albert L.
Yeager) and May C. Yeager, his wife . . . . have not,
nor have either or any or more of them any right, title
or interest, lawful claim or right to the possession o£
the premises described in paragraph 1 of this decree,
or any part thereof, or to the improvements thereon,
or the water or water rights :pertaining to said ]1~
share of stock in the Big Cottonwood Lower Canal
Company, or to said 11~ share of stock, or the certifiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cate therefor; or to the hereditaments and appurtenances unto said real property appertaining; and they
and each and every one of the said named defendants
are hereby enjoined and restrained from ever hereafter
making or asserting any claim of right, title or interest
in, or right to the possession of, or to interfere in any
way with plaintiff's title and right of possession of the
said premises and every part thereof that is described
above and in the .foregoing parts of this decree, and
to the title and right of possession of plaintiff's heirs,
assigns, grantees, privies and personal representatives.
3. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by
the court that whereas the above named defendants
other than the said Albert L. Yeager and May C. Yeager, have not defended this action, but have disclaimed
any interest adversely to the •plaintiff as described in
her complaint herein, the plaintiff is not entitled to
costs as against those defendants, and no decree is
awarded plaintiff against them.
4. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed
that plaintiff Mary A. Harman have and recover judgment against the defendants A1bert L. Yeager and May
C. Yeager her costs herein incurred and taxed at

$.................................... .
5.

It is further ordered and decreed that plain-

tiff's title to the premises described in paragraph 2
hereof, and each ~and every part and parcel thereof,
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is hereby quieted in her as against all and every adverse claim of the said defendants, and each of them.
Allen G. Thurman, Judge.
Dated Oct. 18, 1939.
ReceiY·ed a copy this Sept. 6th A. D. 1939.
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for defendants
Yeager.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. HARMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY G.
YEAGER, his Wife, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF
MOTION

To the Plaintiff and to her counsel, P. G. Ellis and
J. Patton N·eeley:
You and each of you will please take notice that on
Saturday the 18 day of November, 1939, at the hour
of 10 o'clock A. M. of said date or as soon thereafter
a scounsel may be heard, the defendants Albert Yeager and May G. Yeager, will move the above entitled
court to reconsider the motion to vacate decree and
permission to amend answer heretofore ,filed, upon the
grounds therein stated and also upon the grounds of:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court and
the orders of the court by which plaintiff's were given
judgment and defendants were prevented from having
a fair trial; 2) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against; 3) Newly
discovered evidence, material for the party making this
application, which could not with reasonable diligence,
be discovered and produced at the trial; 4) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or decision, said decision being against law, and 5) Error
in law occurring at the trial, which was excepted to, and
said motion will be based further upon the files and
records of the above cause, and upon the affidavits,
testimony and ·evidence to be adduced on behalf of defendants at said hearing.
F. HENRI HIDNRIOD
Attorney for Defendants Albert & May Yeager.
Received copy of the foregoing notice this 2nd day of
November, 1939.
NEELEY & ELLIS
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AMENDED
ANSWER
MARY A. HARMAN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C.
YEAGER, his Wife, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed in connection with motion
to reconsider defendant's m o tion to vacate
decree and for
permission
to amend answer.

(Note: Def-endants tendered in connection with their
motion to reconsider motions to vacate judgment,
new trial and for permission to amend, and in connection with their motions to set aside and vacate
judgment, and in connection with their motion for
new trial (Tr. 82), an amended answer which in
subst~ance contained the following (Tr. 47 to 53
inclusive) :
1. Admit allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of
complaint.
2. Deny generally and specifically every other allegation of the complaint not otherwise specifically
admitted or denied.

For an affinnative defense and praying for affirmative relief, defendants allege:
1. Residence of the parties.

2. That in 1929 defendants were owners and possessed of the property in question, together with other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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property, which they had obtained by deed from Carl
Harlin e.
3. That thereafter and on November 19th, 1932,
defendants deeded to plaintiff the following:
Beginning at ·a point 8. 7 rods South of the
Northwest corner of Lot 8, Block 22, Ten Acre
Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running thence
North 4.35 rods; thence East 46 rods ; thence
South 4.35 rods; thence West 46 rods to the
place of beginning, being the South 1/2 of the
North 1/2 of said Lot 8. Together with 11;4 share
of stock in Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Company.
4.

That for 75 years a fence stood continuously

on or near the north boundary of Lot 8:, and same is
still standing; that defendants originally obtained their
property based on the assumption that said fence was
on the boundary line of Lot 8; that when defendants
conveyed to plaintiff it was the intention to measure
the property by starting at said fence line as the true
boundary of Lot 8; that when defendants conveyed to
plaintiff there was another fence separating the lot intended to he conveyed to plaintiff and that intended to be
retained by defendants; that said fence separating the two
lots had been in place for several years prior to the conveyance and is still in place; that at the time of said
conveyance plaintiff accepted the property on the south
side of this dividing fence and intended to receiv·e only
the property south thereof, and for many years occu-
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pied only said property without complaint of any nature; that said dividing fence was erected in 1929 and
was placed where it is by measuring from the fence
on the north of defendants' property, which had been
in place for 75 years; that neither the plaintiff nor defendants intended to receive or conyey any other property than that south of the dividing fence.
5. That the conveyance from defendants to plaintiff was based on the assumption by both plaintiff and
defendants that the partition fence mentioned was to be
and was the true boundary line between the properties
after said conveyance, and that if said partition fence
were not the true boundary line it was treated as such
b:' plaintiff and defendants, and if it were not the true

boundary line, there was a mutual mistake; that said
partition f.ence was 1neasured from the 75 year old
fence on or near the north boundary of Lot 8; that
measuring from any other line did not and would not
constitute the conveyance agreed upon by plaintiff and
defendants; that any variance other than established
by the fence lines was a mutual mistake and would
affect the substantial rights of the parties; that defendants have no adequate or s·peedy remedy at law,
and will suffer irreparable damage unless equity establishes the boundary set by the fence lines; that the mistake, if any there be, did not arise from any act or
omission of defendants, but was based on the assump-
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tion and intention of plaintiff and defendants alike that
the fences were the boundaries.
6.

That the description set forth in plaintiff's

complaint de,scribes property greatly in excess of that
mentioned in the conveyance from defendants to plaintiff and there is a variance both as to size and shape
of the property.
7.

That for at least 15 years there have been a

fence and ditch on the south of the property occupied
by plaintiff, and that plaintiff and defendants at all
times treated this fence and ditch as the south boundary of plaintiff's propeTty; that they were established
by measuring from the fence supposed to be the north
boundary line of Lot 8, and had measurement been
taken from any other point said fence and ditch would
not have been established at their present situs; that
plaintiff claims her property to said fence and ditch
on the south, which were measured from the fence supposed to be on the north line of Lot 8, and at the same
time claims that the partition fence between her property and defendants' is not the true boundary, though
measured from the same point, and thereby plaintiff
is seeking equity and not doing equity.
8. That for more than 10 years next last past the
defendants have occupied the premises north of the
partition fence and have cultivated said property, planting flowers and crops thereon, building structures there-
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on, and protecting the same, ·and have held said property up to said partition fence adversely to the

plain~

tiff and all the world for said ten years, and have occupied sam.e under claim of title based on fence lines
and natural monuments, improving same, paying taxes
thereon for more than said 10 years, as did their predecessors in title, and that defendants' possession during said time has been open, notorious, uninterrupted
and peaceable under claim of right, save and except as
qualified by the above entitled cause.
9.

That the partition fence between plaintiff's and

defendants' properties was at the time of conveyance
the agreed boundary line separating the properties,
and that said fence was then in place and is now in
place.
10. That for many years after plaintiff received
and accepted said property divided by said partition
fence, said plaintiff treated

~<!.}>artition

fence as the

true boundary line and ma~~bjection or claim for
any property north of said partition fence and represented for many years to defendants and others that
said fence was the true boundary line, and defendants
believed said representations and acted thereon and
plaintiff knew defendants would act thereon and permitted defendants to plant shrubs on said property and
build structures thereof and cultivate crops thereon, to
the expense of defendants, and that defendants acted
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in good faith, and plaintiff is estopped from asserting
any claim to property north of said partition fence.
1.1. That these defendants are the owners and

occupants of all of the property contained between said
partition fence and the fence on or near the north
boundary of Lot 8, Block 22, Flat A, Big Field Survey,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; that the plaintiff
asserts to have some claim or interest in a part ther·eof,
but that plaintiff's claim is without any right whatsoever.
WHEREFOR.E, defendans pray that plaintiff take
nothing by virtue of her complaint, and that a judgment be entered in favor of defendants quieting their
title to the property up to the partition fence herein
mentioned, and that a decree be entered reforming
the deed mentioned herein in paragraph 3, to conform
to the intentions of the parties and reforming the description in said deed, which is in the possession of plaintiff,to conform with the intentions of the parties with respect to natural monuments and fence lines, and that
a decree be entered establishing the boundary line in
accordance with the allegations herein contained, and
for any further and additional relief, which in the discretion of this court seems just, reasonable and equitable, including costs.
F. Henri Henriod, Attorney for Albert Yeager and
May C. Yeager, Defendants.
(Duly Verified).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY A. HARM~,

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C.
YEAGER, his Wife, et al.,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT
62659

(Note: Affidavit tendered by defendant, Albert Yeager
in connection with motions to vacate judgment, new
trial and for permsision to amend, and in connection with motions to set aside and vacate judgment,
and for new trial (Tr. 82), in substance as follows ( Tr. 54-61 inclusive) :
STATE OF UTAH )
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ~ SS
1. That he is one of the defendants herein; that

he incorporates herein the reasons assigned in motion
to vacate decree and for permission to amend answer.
2. That affiant has not had access to any accredited survey; that what surveys have been made are
conflicting, and it is impossible to determine the boundary line of Lot 8 from said surveys; that affiant has
at all times assumed that the north boundary of Lot
8 was marked by a fence which has been in position for
75 years; that said f·ence was not heretofore mentioned
in the pleadings because affiant assumed plaintiff's
claim was based on measurement from said 75 year old
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fence, and it was impossible to determine that plaintiff
made any other claim for property, and affiant could
not determine with due diligence that plaintiff intended
to base her claim on any other theory than measurement from said fence, and that therefore affiant's failure to plead the exact position of said fence line was
excusahl·e neglect, and affiant wishes to amend said
pleadings to conform to the facts; that affiant believes
and states that plaintiff, at the time of accepting deed
to said property, thought that said description was
based on measurement from said fence line.
3.

That at the time the Court heard said motions

and granted motion for judgment on the pleadings for
plaintiff, there was an excusable misunderstanding
concerning the starting point for measurement of said
properties, the defendants assuming that said point was
said boundary fence, and the plaintiff asserting something different, without either party mentioning said
fence, and that any stipulation of boundary was based
on misunderstanding; that because of said misunderstanding there was a mutual mistake of fact making
it appear that the parties were agreed on the line when
i~

fact they were not; that it was impossible for de-

fendants at said tim.e to determine that said misunderstanding existed; that no sworn testimony of any nature was ever taken at the trial; that the motion for
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judgment on the pleadings was granted solely on statements of counsel, and the property rights of the parties
affected by default and without taking of evidence,
which

i~

contrary to the statutes of Utah; that affiant

is desirous of presenting an amended answer setting
forth the facts and praying for reformation of the
deed.
4. That there is a fatal variance in plaintiff's
complaint and the decree with respect to the description
of the property, the complaint stating that the property claimed by plaintiff runs
" .... North 76,775 feet (among other things)"
(Tr. 56)
and the decree states that it runs:
'' .... North 76.775 feet (among other things) ''
(Tr. 56)
the said description in the complaint varying greatly
as to size and shape with that set forth in the decree.
5. That when the Court inquired of plaintiff's
counsel if plaintiff claimed anything north of the line
described in the deed and the answer was "No", affiant herein assumed that the answer was based on a
description whose starting point was the 75 year old
fence; and that affiant likewise assumed the answer of
counsel for defendants, being ''No" was based on the
same fact; that had there been an understanding with
respect to basis for measurement counsel for defenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dants' answer would have been "Yes"; that it is
inequitable to grant judgment on the pleadings upon
such misunderstanding, and without first having heard
sworn testimony and evidence ; that had such evidence
been required, affiant believes and asserts that such
misunderstanding would have been made obvious and
that amendment of the r>leadings would have been allowed and a trial had on the merits, and defendants'
prayer amended to include a request for reformation,
if a true survey should show that the north boundary
of Lot 8 was not the 75 year old fence.
6.

That affiant believes that the Court, on hearing

the statement of counsel, thought the parties were in
agreement as to the boundary, but that such was not
the case; that no evidence or testimony was introduced
to show the boundary intended, and that if such evidence had been introduced the court would not hav·e
given judgment on the pleadings and would have permitted an amendment of defendants' answer, and had
evidence been introduced showing plaintiff had occupied
and accepted her property based on said fence line and
said partition fence, amendment would have been allowed; that the Court's ruling was based on mutual
mistake and misunderstanding, on complete lack of
sworn testimony and evidence, and constituted inadvertence and excusable neglect.
7. That affiant believes and states defendants have
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an affirmativ.e defense based on prescription and adverse possession, which affiant would have asserted
but for said misunderstanding with respect to measuring points; that defendants have occupied the property
on the north of the partition fence at all times since
and before 1932, have paid taxes thereon and improved
the same, and such facts would have appeared had testimony been taken.
8.

That the court's giving judgment on the plead-

ings constituted accident or surprise because of the
misunderstanding, as was the assumption by plaintiff
and eounsel for plaintiff that there was a different
measuring point than said fence; that affiant did not
know at said hearing that there was a diff.erence of
opinion as to starting points and did not discover smne
until after said hearing.
9.

That affiant has newly discovered evidence, 1n

this: That other nearby property owners whose property is described by starting from said fence, have
stated that they considered their property as being
measured from said fence and that this is shown by the
disclaimer filed by some of the defendants in this
cause, the disclaimants' property having been measured
by said fence line and disclaimants assuming that the
fences were the true boundaries; that plaintiff, in obtaining such disclaimer is using the fence lines as a
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basis for measurement, and in making claim from affiant is attempting to use another basis for measurement,
and in so doing is seeking equity but not doing equity.
10.

That there was insufficiency of evidence to

support judgment on the pleadings, there having been
no evidence introduced on behalf of either plaintiff or
defendant.
11.

That there was error in law in granting mo-

tion for judgment on the pleadings and refusing to
grant defendants' motion for a new trial.
12. That affiant has newly discovered evidence,
in this: That plaintiff's complaint calls for more property than does her deed; that said complaint is based
on a private, unofficial survey, which defendants could
not anticipate and of which def.endants did not know
until after said hearing; that affiant believes said survey to be inaccurate.
13.

That ·affiant has newly discovered evidence

in this: That affiant has discovered that other nearby
property owners customarily received one share of
water stock to one acre of ground; that affiant's deed
to plaintiff called for 114 shares and 114 acres of
ground; that plaintiff's complaint calls for more than
114 acr-es of ground.

Albert Yeager
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of NoYember, 1939.
F. Henri Henriod, Notary Public residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Received copy of the foregoing affidaYit this 18th day
of Xov., 1939.

J. Patton Neeley & P. G. Ellis
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

ASSIGX!\IEXTS OF ERROR
Come now Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, defendants in the above entitled cause, and except to and
assign as error the Court's 1) overruling defendants'
demurrer, :May lst, 1939, 2) judgment on pleadings,
September 6th, 1939, 3) trial minutes signed by Judge
based on hearing September 6th, 19:39, 4) written decree quieting title in plainteiff, dated and filed October 18th, 1939, 5) denial of defendants' motions to set
aside decree and permit amendment of answer, October 14th, 1939, and denial of motion for new trial, October 14, 1939, 6) denial of motion to re-consider motion for new trial, motion for new trial and motion to
vacate judgment, February 6th, 1940, and 7) denial
of defendants' motion to an1end answer, September 6th,
1939, and to all other orders and rulings of the Court
in said cause, made and entered adversely to and obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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jected to by Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, defendants.
F. Henri Henriod, Attorney for Defendants, Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager,
his Wife.
The within and foregoing Bill of Exceptions, together with the changes and corrections referred to in
the objection, heretofore presented to the Court, is
hereby settled, approved and allowed, this 21st day of
March, 1940, as and for the bill of' ex0eption in the
within cause.
Allen G. Thurman.
(S.eal)
Pursuant to argument on motions to re-consider
motion for new trial, to vacate judgment and permission to amend pleadings, on November 18th, 1939·, F.
Henri Henriod, counsel for defendants, moved the
Court also: 1) To set aside the judgment, 2) for a new
trial (Tr. 82), and Mr. Neeley, counsel for plaintiff
stated ''I won't object to those motions; they may go
into the record.'' ( Tr. 82). The Court set Wednesday.
December 6th, 1939, to hear evidence in support of
affidavit in support of motions (Tr. 84). On December
6th, hearing was had, counsel for plaintiff objecting to
introduction of any testimony in support of the affidavit, and was overruled. (Tr. 84).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
Oscar J. Harline was sworn and examined and testified (Tr. 8:5, et seq.) that he was agent for property
south of plaintiff's; that there was a fence between his
and plaintiff's property for 17 years, and that it has
been there, he thought since a little after 1892 (Tr. 86);
that there has been a ditch there about the same length
of time (Tr. 87); that he considered this fence and ditch
as the dividing line or north line of his property (Tr.
87 and 90); that his father owned the entire tract, and
sold the north half about 1922; that he lived in the
district at that time; that he knows there is a fence
between the Harman (plaintiff) ·and Yeager ( defendants') property, and that it has been there five years
or probably more; that he knows of a fence on the
north of the defendants' property that continues the
whole length of the block and that this fence has been
ther.e fifty years or more (Tr. 92); that he was one of
the defendants in this action and signed a paper (disclaimer) to l\lrs. Harman establishing the old fence
line; that at no time did he consider that he had an
interest north of the f-ence and ditch line (Tr. 93);
that he is acquainted with other properties in the
vicinity and knows that one share of water goes with
one acre of ground (Tr. 93); that he is selling the north
half of the south half of Lot 8 to a Mr. Tilby, and
that in doing so he was using the fence and ditch line
as the boundary of the property and that Mr. Tilby
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was dealing on the same basis ; that in all of the trans-.
actions with which he is acquainted the fence lines have
been considered as the true boundaries ( Tr. 94).
Mrs. Jessie B. Ence was sworn and examined and
testified that she was owner of property in the vicinity
on the west of 11th East (Tr. 94); that the south line
of her property was even with the north line of the
Yeager property; that there has always been a fence
on this line since she lived there, which has been for
20 years (Tr. 95); that she has always considered this
fence line the correct line (Tr. 96) ; that she is no relation to Yeagers, but is a neighbor; that there is a ditch
along her south line; that she received water shares
when she bought the property and bought five acres
and received five shares (Tr. 96); that one share of
water goes with one acre of ground.
Thereupon Mr. Henriod stated that h_e would like
to ask Mrs. Harman (the plaintiff) a question or two, to
which counsel for Mrs. Harman objected. Thereafte1·
the abstract of title was introduced by counsel for defendants, and abstract of title was introduced by counsel for plaintiff.
ARGUMENT

Introduction: This case concerns itself with a complaint setting forth allegations designed to quiet title
to certain property described therein. A demurrer thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
to was overruled, and the defendants filed an answer
in substance stating that certain property was described
in a deed executed and delivered b~~ defendants to
plaintiff on or about

November 18th, 1932; that

"divid·ing the property so co-nveyed from the p·roperty retained, a fence had bee11 constructed by the defendants and Lras standing at the time of the conveyance above mentioned a-nd that said plaintiff ha-s been
in possession of the property conveyed south of the
said fence and no part of the plaintiff (defendants'?)
land has been in the possession of sa.id pla.intiff"

and that "so far a,s any conflict exists between/ property described above and wi-thin the fence line as hereinabove described, these defendants deny the allegations
of said plaintiff's complaint and

the whole thereof

and alleges that plaintiff is not entitled to any part
or portion of said North lj2 of the North lf:.. of the
North ¥2\ of Lot 8, Block 22, T·en Acre Flat A (Tr. 8
and 9). Upon the date of the trial of said cause, coun·
sel for both sides made statements, but no evidence
or testimony of any nature was taken. During the discussion between Court and couns-el, and before any nwtion for j1tdgment on the pleadings was made by counsel
for plaintiff, counsel for defendant asked permission
to amend his answer (Tr. 77) and such permission was

objected to by counsel for plaintiff (Tr. 77). Counsel
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for defendants then requested 24 hours in which to
amend, and counsel for plaintiff again objected (Tr.
78), and the Court stated that it would entertain a motion for judgment on the ·pleadings, and the motion
being made, was granted by the Court without giving
counsel for defendants the requested permission to
amend his answer. The plaintiff had at no time demurred to defendants' answer, and there had been no
opportunity to pass on the sufficiency of the pleadings
up to that point.
Subsequently, defendants made a motion to vacate
the decree and for permission to amend the answer
(Tr. 21), and made a motion for a new trial (Tr. 22),
which were aU denied by the Court (Tr. 25). A written
decree was thereafter entered quieting title in plaintiff
(Tr. 27, 28 and 29), to property differently described
than was

de~cribed

in the complaint (Tr. 1), the com-

plaint being different than the decre.e in that the description states that starting from a cerain point the
property runs "North 76,775 feet . . . ", the decree
stating "North 76.775 feet ... ", and differing also in
that the description in the complaint does not have the
words "Ten-acre plat A", whereas the decree does,
and differing also in that the description in the complaint does not have the words ''to a point which is
4.35 rods or 71.775 feet south of said northwest corner
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of said lot 8 '' whereas the decree does, and differing
also in that the description in the complaint does not
contain the words ''to a point which is 151.55 feet south
of the northeast corner of said lot 8, in block 22, 10acre Plat A, Big· Field Survey," whereas the decree
does, and differing also in that the description in the
complaint, or any part of the complaint contains the
words ''Together with all improvements thereon, and
all hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, and also together with 11;4 share of stock in the
Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Company, and all water
and water rights represented by said 11,4 share of
stock,'' whereas the decree does contain such quoted
words and phrases.
This decree was entered on October 18th, 1939, and
thereafter and on November 2nd, 1939, defendants
served and filed Notice of Motion wherein they proposed to move the Court on November 18th, 1939, to reconsider the motion to vacate decree and permission to
amend answer (Tr. 34), and they set forth all the statutory grounds previously set forth in their former motions (Tr. 21 and 22), a.dding in said Notice of Motion,

however, an additional statutory ground, i.e., newly discovered evidence, material for the applicant, which
could not with reasonable diligence, be discovered and
produced at the trial
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In support of the motions for which said notice
was served and filed, defendants tendered a verified
amended answer (Tr. 47 to 53 incl.), and one of the
appellants, Mr. Yeager, tendered his affidavit in support of the motions ( Tr. 54 to 61 incl.), setting forth
reasons for having a trial on the merits. The matter
was continued to take testimony in further support of
the motions, and it was stipulated that the affidavit of
Mr. Yeager (Tr. 54) stated facts to which he would
testify if sworn (Tr. 83), and two witnesses were sworn
in support of defendants' motion, Mr. Oscar J. Harline and l\1rs. Jessie B. Ence ( Tr. 8:5 to 97 incl.). Counsel for defendants, at the hearing on said motions, also
made motions in o:pen court to 1) reconsider the motions theretofore filed, and separately and independently and not by way of re-consideration, to 2) s·et aside
and vacate the judgment, and to 3) grant a new trial,
(Tr. 82), which motions were not objected to by counsel
for respondent. (Tr. 82.)
Thereafter, the various motions were denied by
the court, and appellants appeal from all the rulings
of the court and from the judgment on the pleadings
given by the court in favor of respondent, and in
attacking said rulings, respectfully represent as follows:
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
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MOTIO~

FOR JUDGnlENT ON THE PLEAD-

IXGS IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT.
A. It is subn1itted that the appellants and defendants in their amended answer (Tr. 8) sufficiently
denied the allegations of the complaint, to raise an
issue requiring the taking of evidence and testimony.
In answering paragraph 4 of the complaint, which was
the paragraph claiming ownership and possession of the
described property, the defendants stated:
''That dividing the property so conveyed from
the property retained a fence had been con·structed by the defendants and was standing at
the time of the conveyance a,bov.e mentioned and
that said plaintiff has been in possession of the
property conveyed south of said fence and no
part of the plaintiff (defendants~) land has
been in the poss·ession of said plaintiff.''
Also:
''So far as any conflict exists between property
described above and within the fence line as
hereinabove described these defendants deny the
allegations of said plaintiff's complaint and the
whole thereof and allege that plaintiff is not
entitled to any part or portion of the said North
lf2 of the North lj2 of the North lj2 of Lot 8,
Block 22, Ten Acre Plat A, Big Field Surv·ey,
:Salt Lake City, Utah."
It is submitted that these allegations, though some-

what inartistic are certainly not admissions that plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of
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the property she described and certainly constitute denials of any claim by plaintiff for land north of the
fence line mentioned, and are diametrically opposed to
an admission justifying judgment on the pleadings.
Cases are legion holding that such an answer constitutes a denial which raises an issue that must be tried
to the court or jury, but inasmuch as our own Supreme
Court has spoken it would seem inapropos to cite authorities from other jurisdictions. In the case of
Hancock vs. Luke, 148 Pac. 4.52; 46
Utah 26, 1915,
a case where an appeal was taken from judgment on
the pleadings, the plaintiff, an .attorney, sued to rescind
a contract to purchase stock, wherein, among other
things, defendant had purportedly agreed to employ
the plaintiff, the plaintiff praying that the contract be
rescinded for fraud and misrepresentation. To the complaint .an answer was filed containing lengthy allegations, some of which admitted the contract and the allegations of the complaint, and some of which were
inconsistent ther·ewith, the answer further denying each
and every other allegation in said complaint contained.
No demurrer had been interposed to the answer. Judgment on the pleadings was given on motion of defendant. Plaintiff asked leave to amend and such leave
was denied. The court, among other things said:
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"Under our statute, 'a pleading for the purpos·e
of determining· its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed with a view to substantial
justice between the parties. ' Com. Laws 1907,
Sec. 2986. \Yhere it is clear, therefore that a
denial of particular allegations of the complaint
was intended, the mere form of such denial is
not alwa~-s conclusiYe. ''
The court also said:
''The motion for judgment on the pleadings was,
in legal effect, a general demurrer to the answer,
and such demurrer searches the entire record,
including the sufficiency of the complaint."
The court commented on the fact that our statutes do
not have a provision for a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, but that our courts have inherent power,
independent of statute, to grant such a motion. But,
said the court:
"Motions for judgments on the pleadings ar;e,
however, not favored by the courts, and upon
such a motion the pleadings will be construed
with great liberality in favor of the party whose
pleadings are assailed,''
citing a number of cases, included in which was Giles
vs. Recamier, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 354, a part of the opinion of which the court quoted approvingly :
"It is a dangerous practice to allow either party
to interpose an oral demurrer at the trial, to
the pleading of his adversary. If a pleading be
substantially defective, the honest course is to
demur to it, and thus give court and counsel a
fair opportunity to examine and consider the
question of law that is involved. If there be any
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reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the
pleading, the court should deny a motion that is
sprung at the trial, for judgment on the pleadings."
In our principal c;1se we have the same situation, except that we have a stronger case for the application of
the above principles, in view of the fact that in our
principal case, appellants made application for permission to amend their answer prior to motion for judgment on the pleadings, (Tr. 77), wher-eas in the Hancock case, the motion for permission to amend came
after the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and

it was because of the fact that the motion came after
the judgment that Justice l\IcCarty dissented.

In

this connection, calling attention to Tr. 77 and 78,
Mr. Cluff, counsel for defendants, said:

"I am ask-

ing to amend, Your Honor,'' which wa.s objected to.
Again Mr. Cluff said: "I ask the privilege of 24
hours in which to prepare an amendment," which
wa.s objected to and the Court immediately, without further consideration, said it would ·entertain a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, which motion
was promptly granted. Justice Frick, in the majority
opinion in the Hancock case, continued as follows:
"If in this case, plaintiff had interposed a general demurrer to the answer, and the court had
sustained it, the defendants would have been

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
permitted to amend their answer as a matter
of course, under the practice, if not a.s a matter
of right. . . . In our judgment there is not a
respectable attorney practicing in this jurisdiction who would question the right of his adYersan~ to at least attempt to an1end a pleading
after a general demurrer had been sustained by
the court. Is there any reason for a different
rule in ca&e of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings 1 \Ye confess our inability to discover
an~· substantial difference between a general demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleading·s. insofar as the right to amend is conoerned. ''
We commend also the other statements made in the
case

b~· ~Ir.

Justice Frick and

~ir.

Justice Straup,

establishing the above principles in the State of Utah,
but space does not permit further quotation.

Another Utah case adhering to the doctrine above
is that of

Tooele Aleat Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 168 Pac.
427, 57 Utah 1, 1917,
wherein plaintiff sought to set aside a judgment obtained in another case, claiming the complaint in the
other action was based on fraud and misrepresentation. The defendant answered generally and in some
instances specifically. The plaintiff did not put 1n any
·evidence but the defendant did. The plaintiff, on appeal, claims that judgment should have been given on
the pleadings, and the court said :
"Under our statutes (Com. Laws 1907, Sec.
2986), the allegations and averments in plead~
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ings must be liberally construed. That s-ection
reads:
'In the construction of a pleading for the
purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed with a
view to substantial justice between the
parties.'
If, therefore, we apply the provisions of that
section to defendant's answer i.r this case it
cannot be doubted that the answer does present
an issue of fact and hence is sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The court therefore did not err in refusing to
enter judgm-ent for the plaintiff.''
Com. Laws 1907, Sec. 2986 is identical to Title 104-13-1,
R. S. U. 1933. The pleadings in the above case are sub-

stantially similar to those of our principal case, and
we submit that the decision in the Tooele case should
apply to our cas·e. Another case re-iterating the Utah
principle is that of
Johnson v. 111ounta:in St. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
159 Pac. 526; 48 Utah 339,

and many others from other jurisdictions which we
feel need not be cited in view of the law of our own
state. The above cited cases should conclusively determine our principal case and the error committed by the
District Judge in granting judgment on the pleadings.
II.

THE DIJSTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANTS.t

MOTION

TO

RECONSIDER

FOR~fEH M01~IONS, AND IN DENYING AP-
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PELLANTS' INDEPENDENT

MOTION

FOR

A KEW TRIAL AND TO VACATE JUDGMENT.
As has been stated hereinabove, appellants moved
the court to re-consider former motions for new trial,
vacate judgment and permission to amend, ( Tr. 34)
and also moved the court independently and S·epara tely
for a new trial and to vacate the judgment (Tr. 82),
and in support of these various motions presented new
and additional statutory grounds, i.e., that of newly
discovered evidence, and in further support of said
motions tendered a ,·erified answer ( Tr. 47 to 53), an
affidavit of one of the appellants (Tr. 54 to 61), and
sworn testimony of two witnesses (Tr. 85 to 97), and
introduced the abstract of title (Tr. 97).
The case of Luke vs. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, was
strongly urged by counsel for respondent as authority
for the proposition that the court could not entertain
said motions to re-consider and said motion for new
trial and to vacate judgment. It is true, Luke vs. Coleman states that a motion to re-hear a motion for a new
trial is foreign to our statutes on procedure, but the
court in that case restricted its decision to motions to
re-hear the very same thing on the very same grounds.
Where additional grounds or new evidence is presented,
Luke vs. Coleman is not applicable, the court acknowledging its inapplicability in such case when it said:
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''
According to some of these decisions,
a s·econd application for a new trial may be
made within the term in which the judgment was
r-endered, when it is based on grounds not included in the first application, and satisfactory
reasons given for the omission. The plaintiff,
however, did not proceed on the theory of a
second application based on new grounds, but on
the theory of a rehearing and a resubmission
of the grounds already passed upon and adjudged on the first application . . . . "
In our principal case there is no question but that new
grounds were presented in support of a second application, and an answer, affidavit, testimony and evidence tendered in support thereof. In the original motions in our principal case no affidavit or answer was
tendered. Luke vs. Coleman is not applicable in our
principal case for the further reason that a more recent
Utah case, that of

Lund vs. Third District Court, 62 Pac.
(2) 278, 90 Utah 433, 1935,
r-educes Luke vs. Coleman to its own facts and none
other. In the Lund case, a motion for a new trial had
been denied during the term. After term time it was
discovered that one of the jurors had been incompetent,
and upon application for a new trial, based on accident
and surprise, a new trial was granted, and the ruling
upheld by our Supreme Court, on the principle that
if ther-e be additional grounds presented in support

of

the motion and such grounds are meritorious, a new
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trial may be granted regardless of the fact that a motion for a new trial had ·previously been denied. In
our principal case sufficient additional grounds have
been presented which were not mentioned in the preYious motion, to bring it within the purview of the
Lund case. The appellants in bringing in witnesses in
support of their motions also satisfied the rule in Utah
that something in addition to the affidavits must be
offered. It might be stated also, for what it may be
worth, that in the Luke case the motion to re-hear
was made long after term time, while in our principal
case the motion to re-hear was made well within tenn
time.
We feel that quite apart from the Utah authorities
the court abused its discretion in not relieving appellants from the judgment entered. The Court, upon presentation of the motions and evidence tendered in support thereof, could have invoked the power given it
under Title 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
providing for relief from a judgment, especially since
the whole record indicates a willingness and desire on
the part of the appellants to try the case on its merits
and not merely on the pleadings. The tender of answer,
of the affidavit, of costs, the various motions, and the
bringing of witnesses into court would seem to disclose a desire to try the case, and certainly does not
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evince a desire to have the case go by default by way
of judgment on the pleadings. Surely the spirit of Title
104-57-12, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, if not the
lett.er thereof, was also abused by the District Judge in
this case, when such statute states that the court in
real property cases
'' . . . . must not enter any judgment by default
against unknown defendants, but must in all
cases require e·vidence of plaintiff's title and
possession and hear such evidence as may be
offered respecting the claims and title of any
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter
judgment in accordance with the evidence and
the law.... ''
Surely, the appellants would ha.ve been better off in
our principal case, in view of this statute, if they had
not answered at all, for in that case the plaintiff would
have been put to her proof by sworn testimony and
evidence. A fortiori, where a defendant does answer,
there is more reason to take evidence than where a default judgment is taken, and less reason to give judgment on the pleadings as was done in our principal
case without one word of testimony or evidence, but
only upon confused

~Statements

of counsel.

The appellants have done about everything they
could have done under the circumstances to attempt
to bring this case to trial, and we submit that the
Court abused its discretion in not allowing appellants
their day in court. The books are full of authority sus-
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taining the power of a court during term to grant permission to try a cause on its merits, where there may
have been a technicality that temporarily impeded the·
progress thereof.
Vol. 3, Bancroft's Pract,ice, Chapter
VII, pages 2432 et seq.,
15 Ruli11g Ca.se Lau:, page 688 et seq.
On page 2433 of Bancroft it is stated:
''Within proper limits and under proper circumstances eYery court of record has authority
to vacate its own judgments. While it has been
regulated to a large extent by legislation, this
power is inherent and in some cases independent
of statute. . . . ''
And ev-en though a court may follow the statutory
technique (p. 2459) :
"Where a motion is based upon a ground which
the court is held to have inherent power to vacate a judgment, as in case of fraud or the inadvertence of the court, and not upon a statutory ground, the power of the court is not governed by the statutory limitation as to time .... "
and on page 2477:
''On the other hand the circumstances 1nay be
such as to make it an abuse of discretion to
deny an application to open a default or set
aside a judgment. If the moving party makes
a clear and unquestionable showing that he has
a good defense or cause of action on the merits,
of the benefit of which he has been deprived
without fault on his part, the court has little
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lief, its action may be set aside and proper relief
ordered by the appellate court. . . . ''
and on page 24 78 :

''An appellate court is inclined to listen more
readily to an appeal from an order denying relief than one granting relief, because of the
policy of applying remedial statutes liberally to
permit a trial on the merits . . . . ''
. . . . It is the undoubted general rule that this
power should be exercised liberally in furtherance of justice and in view of the policy of the
law and the statutes governing relief, to have
cases disposed of on their merits rather than
upon technicalities and fortuitous circumstances.
. . . If reasonable minds might differ as to the
propriety of setting aside a judgment upon a
proper and timely application and showing, the
doubt should be resolved in f-avor of the applicant.''
and see also page 248:9 which states as a general principle the doctrine of Lund vs. Third District Court, and
see also the Ruling Case Law citations, principally at
page 688, 689, and 708.
It is therefore submitted that in the light of the

Lund case, the statutes of Utah, and the general authorities cited, the Court abused its discretion in giving
judgment on the pleadings and in refusing to g-rant a
new trial and permit amendment of the answer, and in
refusing to grant a new trial and vacate judgm·ent when
new, additional and o·bviously meritorious grounds were
presented,-and in this respect may it be pointed out
that the answer, affidavit and evidence tendered by ap-
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pellants were not resisted by counter-affidavit or
counter-evidence or reply of any nature on the part of
respondent.

III. THE DECREE ENTERED BY THE COURT IS
FATALLY AT VARIA.NCE WITH THE CONTEXT A~D PRAYER OF THE COMPLAINT.
The discrepancies pointed out in the '' Introduction" herein above, it is submitted, make it obvious
that the Court went far afield in its judgment in granting more relief and inserting more description than
called for in the complaint. It is also obvious that the
property described in the complaint, although the
"North 76,775 feet" probably was intended for "North
76.775," the comma being a pro.bable ·error, is vastly
different in size and shape than that described in the
decree. True, the use of the comma in the description
instead of a period may have been an error, but there
was no effort to amend the description, and the same
has never been amended, and we submit that if the
respondent is ·willing to rely on a technicality based
on inartistic wording of an answer when the meaning
was obviously to deny the complaint, then surely the
appellants should be entitled to rely on the misplacement of a comma in order to have their day in court.

It is further submitted that a calculation of the area
as described in the decree of the court makes for a
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discrepancy with the area described In the deed to respondent. Surely the court erred in giving the respondent more land in its decre.e than was called for in
the deed, when the court itself gave judgment on the
pleadings ostensibly based on the descriptions in the
deeds.
With respect to the merit of appellants' theory
with respect to reformation as shown in their tendered
amended answer, it is unnecessary to cite authorities
here in support of the principles with respect to natural
monuments, mutual mistake, estoppel, fence-line law
and the like, but it is submitted that appellants, in their
tendered amended answer,

affidavit, evidence and

proof, have certainly set forth matters which, if they
had been presented in the first instance would have
called for a trial on the merits. Hence, since there is
no question with respect to the merit of appellants'
proposed defense and prayer for relief, counsel feels
that the questions of abuse of discretion, granting of
n~w

trials, sufficiency of pleadings with respect to

judgments on the pleading and the like should be the
only questions presented to this court as has been
attempted hereinabove.
In conclusion, we submit that a careful reading of
the transcript from beginning to end and examination
of the pleadings, the discourses of counsel and the other
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matters contailH_•d in this cast>, will 1nake obvious the
desire of the appellants to have their day in court, nnd
the denial of that right through no fault of their own.
We feel that this matter, which vitally affects the substantial property rights of the parties, should be sent
back to the lower court with instructions to allow appellants to file an amended answer and have this case
tried on sworn testimony, evidence and fact, and not
upon the bickerings of counsel and court on matters
which the record obviously discloses led to confusion
and misunderstanding.
Respectfully submitted,

F. HE·NRI HENRIOD,
Attorney for Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

